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Introduction
Fiscal decentralization (FD) is an institutional mechanism that ideally helps to reveal preferences of local citizens and, hence, facilitates effective local public good provision via increased transparency and accountability. The potential benefits of FD have been studied widely following the seminal work of Oates (1972) . Tanzi (2000 Tanzi ( , 2008 argues that structural and institutional conditions, particularly the country size and governance quality, affect the potential effectiveness of FD. Recent empirical studies have also reached a near-consensus that the positive effects of FD hinge upon the level of institutional and economic development (see, for example, De Mello, 2000; King and Ma, 2001; Neyapti, * Tel.: +90 312 290 2030; fax: +90 266 5140. E-mail address: neyapti@bilkent.edu.tr. 2004 , 2010 Zhang, 2006; Adam et al., 2008; Bouton et al., 2008; Kyriacou and Sagales, 2009 ). This explains why earlier studies presented mixed evidence on the macroeconomic benefits (often focusing on growth or efficiency) of FD (see, for example, Treisman, 2000; Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Jin and Zou, 2002; MartinezVazquez and McNab, 2006) .
The absence of a supportive institutional environment, however, hinders FD's effectiveness in achieving allocational and distributional efficiency. When large horizontal and vertical imbalances exist and local governments do not face sufficient incentives to internalize the burden of local spending, FD often fails to deliver its objectives. If fiscal policy guidelines and rules are not well defined or enforced at the aggregate level, decentralizing spending and revenue collection fails to deliver fiscal discipline. Duly, recent theoretical studies emphasize the important role that fiscal rules (FR) play for FD to attain the desired welfare gains. More specifically, they point at the role of rule-based transfer mechanisms and hard budget constraints to generate the incentives for local government efficiency (see, for example, Sanguinetti and Tomassi, 2004; Stowhase and Traxler, 2005; Akin et al., 2011) .
Recent studies document the state of FR around the world and highlight the importance of rule-based fiscal mechanisms in improving fiscal outcomes.
1 Schaechter et al. (2012) point out that an increasing number of countries have adopted FR, and the significant role of crises on this trend. Budina et al. (2012) observe a negative relationship between FR and public debt. Litschig (2012) and Wyplosz (2012) , on the other hand, caution about the manipulability of FR, indicating that rules without strong institutional backing and enforcement characteristics would not yield their intended goals; in particular, too strict rules are argued to be associated with weaknesses during implementation.
In view of the above, this paper presents an original empirical test of the hypothesis that FR play a significant role in the effectiveness of FD. Using the recent panel datasets on FD and FR, and controlling for the relevant structural and institutional characteristics, the hypothesis is tested for both expenditure and revenue decentralization. The empirical evidence indicate that balance budget rules, their formal enforcement procedures, and expenditure rules contribute to the effectiveness of FD in achieving fiscal discipline, while debt rules have a direct effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the data sources that are utilized in testing the above stated hypothesis. Section 3 reports the findings and, finally, Section 4 concludes.
Data and model specification
We consider that the primary objective of FD is fiscal discipline. The hypothesis tested here is that the effectiveness of FD in attaining fiscal discipline, measured by budget deficits, increases with the presence of fiscal policy rules. We employ the most recent and extensive panel data on FD (expenditure and revenue decentralization, denoted by FDexp and FDRev, respectively) provided by the World Bank.
2 The source of data on FR is the IMF, which, based on formal and objective evaluation criteria, classifies FR as balanced budget (BBR); debt (DR); expenditure (ER); and revenue (RR) rules.
3
To test the hypothesis that FR enhances the effectiveness of FD, consider the following regression model:
where the subscript it represents the country (i)-year (t) observations, and Def is the ratio of budget deficits to GDP. Z represents the set of control variables used commonly in the related literature, namely the government size (G, measured as the share of overall government spending in GDP), rate of economic growth (gr, measured as the percentage change in real GDP), governance (gov); and 1 Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) discuss the benefits of FR for US budgeting. While Ma (1997) discusses the pros and cons of different fiscal transfer rules, Shah (2006) discusses the pros and cons of different agent types in charge of designing institutions, which govern fiscal grants.
2 Various studies have pointed out the problems related to a consistent measurement of FD across countries (see, for example, Dziobek et al., 2011 and Timofeev, 2009 the country size (measured by the log of population: Log(pop)). 4 The rationale for these controls is as follows. Large governments can be associated with low fiscal discipline, hence G is expected to have a positive effect on deficits; gr accounts for business cycles and is expected to have a negative association with deficits that tend to be counter-cyclical. By the very nature of its measurement criteria, 5 gov is expected to be negatively associated with deficits. pop is a proxy for the heterogeneity in preferences that is one of the justifications for FD 6 ; since heterogeneity may also worsen the common pool problem and increase budgetary imbalances, however, we do not have a strong prior on the sign of this variable. The main hypothesis of the paper states that FD itself may not be negative or significant (see, for example, Thiessen, 2003; Neyapti, 2010) ; given the possible nonlinear effects of FD we use it in logs to test this hypothesis.
Our null hypothesis is that it is not necessarily c or d, but it is e that is significantly negative in the above model; that is, FD may not achieve fiscal discipline if FR are not in place. In addition to the interactions between FD and FR, we also report the interactions of FR with a dummy variable that stands for the legal enforcement of FR: Enforce.
7 Given the autoregressive structure of deficits, the estimation involves the lagged values of Def.
The model is estimated using an unbalanced panel with a total of 137 observations. 8 The estimation of the above model calls for several cautions. First, the presence of the lagged dependent variable renders the use of fixed or random effects inappropriate due to the violation of the assumption of exogenous covariates. Second, pooled OLS estimation is inconsistent if there are individual effects. The appropriate method therefore appears to be the dynamic panel data estimation with GMM instruments (AB-DPD), which yields consistent estimates (see Arellano and Bond, 1991) . We also utilize this even though the use of the method reduces the number of observations to 34.
Estimation results
As a preliminary, we investigate whether there is any significant difference in sample average Def before and after the implementation of (any type of) FR; we find that the answer is no. 10 We next turn to the regression analysis to assess, in addition to the direct effect of FR on Def, its indirect effect via its impact on the effectiveness of FD. 10 Two years' averages are considered to maximize the number of observations before and after the adoption of a fiscal rule, leading to 65 and 53 observations, Table 1 reports the results of the AB-DPD estimations with robust errors, using the alternative measurements of both FD and FR. The instrument list is composed of the GMM instruments of the covariates besides the polity index, which is considered exogenous.
11 The table shows that besides the lagged deficits term that exhibits significant persistence, some of our control variables are consistently significant with the expected sign: while G has significant positive effect on budget deficits, gr has a significant negative effect on Def. gov is not significant probably because FD, FR and Enforce may already be capturing the effects of governance quality. The negative significance of pop possibly reflects the effect of other country-specific or trend elements, given this variable's relative persistence over the limited time dimension in a given country.
The main finding that provides support for the hypothesis of this paper is the interactive effect of FD and FR, which is negative and significant in the case FR = {BBR, ER} when used with expenditure decentralization. DR, however, has a direct effect on Def that is negative and significant, when used along with both FD types. When the model is estimated using revenue decentralization, the hypothesis is supported only in the case of BBR, although the direct effects of DR and ER are also negative and significant. the hypothesis of the paper, the mostly positive and significant direct effects on Def of both FDexp and FDrev should not come as a surprise; they indicate that FD generally fails to achieve fiscal discipline in the absence of FR. The coefficients of the interactions between FR and the Enforce dummy are negative and significant for FR = BBR in the cases of both FDexp and FDrev, while this interaction term is dropped due to collinearity for estimations using the rest of the FR terms. The above findings are in support of the recent literature that stresses the important role of fiscal institutions for the effectiveness of FD in delivering economic efficiency. It further presents original empirical evidence on the significant role of the centrally imposed budget constraints and debt rules, as well as the existence of fiscal rule enforcement procedures, in reaping the benefits of FD. 
Conclusions
Recent literature suggests that the effectiveness of FD in delivering fiscal efficiency depends on structural and institutional characteristics of a country. Using recent panel datasets of FR and FD, this paper presents original evidence on the significant interactive effects of these variables on budget deficits. The evidence presented here indicate that the effectiveness of both expenditure and revenue decentralization on reducing budget deficits significantly depends on the existence of FR, particularly balanced-budget rules. Debt rules, on the other hand, have significant direct effects on fiscal discipline. While the current findings are based on a limited sample, they pose important policy advice for fiscal institutional design: countries that intend to decentralize their fiscal activities can increase their fiscal efficiency with the proviso that they also adopt FR and improve their enforcement procedures. 
